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PROPERTY-CONTINGENT REMAINDERS-RULE
OF DESTRUCTIBILITY ABOLISHED IN NEW MEXICO.
Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 93 N.M. 332, 600 P.2d 278
(1979).

INTRODUCTION

A recent New Mexico Supreme Court case, Abo Petroleum Corp.
v. Amstutz,' abolished the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders in New Mexico. The applicability of this common law rule
had not previously been decided in New Mexico. The holding thus
alters a portion of the English common law which had been adopted
in New Mexico.'
The contingent remainder was developed by the English common
law of estates in land. It was defined by Blackstone as an estate in remainder3 which is limited to take effect either to an uncertain person or upon an uncertain event. 4 At common law, a contingent remainder was destructible.' Thus, if A conveyed land to B for life, remainder to C if he reached age 21, and C predeceased B at age 19, or
if B died when C was 19, the contingent remainder in C was
destroyed. Further, if A conveyed land to B for life, remainder to C
if C reached age 21, and then A granted all his interest in the land by
quitclaim deed to B in fee simple while C was still under age 21, the
contingent remainder in C was destroyed. In the first example, the
common law found that destruction had occurred as a result of
"failure to vest" in the time allowed. 6 In the second example,
destruction occurred under common law as a result of merger." The
1. 93 N.M. 332, 600 P.2d 278 (1979).
2. New Mexico adopted the common law of England as it existed in 1789 by statute. See
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-3 (1978).
3. "A remainder is a future interest which is limited in favor of a transferree in such a manner that it can become a present interest upon the termination of all prior interests
simultaneously created, but cannot divest any interest other than an interest in the transferor."
Wright, The Present Status of the Rule of Destructibility in Pennsylvania, 27 Temp. L.Q. 207,
207 (1947).
4. L. Simes & A. Smith, The Law of Future Interests § 11 (2d ed. 1956).
5. Id. § 193.
6. Contingent remainders failed to "vest in time" when the normal termination of the freehold estate occurred before the contingent remainder had vested. Id. § 194.
7. The doctrine of merger dictates that whenever successive vested estates are owned by the
same person, the larger of the two estates will absorb the smaller. C. Moynihan, Introduction
to the Law of Real Property 131-32 (1962).
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rule of destructibility in actual practice consists of rules with respect
to situations in which contingent remainders cease to exist.'
The rule of destructibility developed from the feudal concept of
seisin.1 Although seisin at one time meant possession of land, in the
fourteenth century the word came to mean possession under claim of
a freehold estate therein.' 0 One basic principle of the doctrine was
that the seisin of land could never be held in abeyance; someone
always had to be seised of any given piece of land." The absolute
rule of no abeyance is thought to have been created to protect the
feudal landowner's interests.II The rule of no abeyance allowed the
landowner to determine readily who was responsible for the performance of feudal obligations. The rule of destructibility was a
concomitant of the rules relative to seisin. Destructibility, however,
also promoted the alienability of land by insuring that land would
not be tied up indefinitely while the contingent remainders continued
in existence.'" The rule of destructibility was maintained in the common law even after displacement of the feudal system and the
diminished significance of the concept of seisin.
THE CASE
The precise issue in Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz was whether
a contingent remainder could be destroyed by merger.'" The grandparents of the defendants owned in fee simple the property in dispute. By two separate instruments, each dated in 1908 and each entitled "Conditional Deed," the grandparents conveyed life estates in
two separate parcels to their two daughters. The deeds also conveyed
contingent remainders to the children of the daughters who survived
8. In addition to destruction by merger and "failure to vest in time" (expiration of time),
contingent remainders could be destroyed by forfeiture. Id. at 130-31. In feudal times,
forfeiture occurred when a life tenant made a feoffment in fee. This form of conveyance was
regarded as a wrong to the lord. As such, the person who had the next vested estate had a right
of entry. Because they had not vested at the time of forfeiture, contingent remainders which
were to take effect after the life estate were destroyed. L. Simes & A. Smith, supra note 4,

§ 195.
9. Seisin was the "completion of the feudal investiture, by which the tenant was admitted into the feud, and performed the rights of homage and fealty." Black's Law Dictionary 1219
(5th ed. 1979). See note 36 infra.
10. C. Moynihan, supra note 7, at 87-88.
11. Wright, supra note 3, at 207.
12. Id.
13. L. Simes & A. Smith, supra note 4, § 193.
14. 93 N.M. at - ,600 P.2d at 280.
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them.I 5 In 1911, the grandparents executed a warranty deed to one
daughter. In 1916, a second warranty deed was executed to the same
daughter conveying only a portion of the property. A warranty deed
was executed to the other daughter in 1916. This deed's stated purpose was to correct the first 1908 deed by attempting to convey a fee
simple absolute. After the execution of the deeds, each daughter had
children.
Each daughter later attempted to convey her property in fee
simple to the predecessors of the plaintiff.1 6 Thus, the plaintiff in the
action, Abo Petroleum Corporation, was the successor in interest to
the daughters. The defendants were the children of the two
daughters of the original owners of the property.
The main issue in the case was whether the grandparents' conveyances in the 1911 and 1916 deeds to the daughters of all their
right, title, and interest had destroyed the grandchildren's contingent
remainders.' 7 The plaintiffs contended that the daughters' interests
had merged with their parents' (the grandparents of defendants) interest in 1911 and 1916 to give the daughters a fee simple estate,
thereby destroying the defendants' contingent remainders by
merger. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the rule of destructibility would not be applied; thus, the.contingent remainders
were not destroyed. ' 8 The court stated that the daughters had acquired no more interest in the properties through the later deeds than
they possessed from the 1908 conditional deeds.' 9 The court held
that the daughters had therefore conveyed only the life estates that
they had originally acquired in 1908.20 The predecessors of the plaintiff thus had acquired only life interests in the properties which had
expired at the deaths of the two daughters."I
THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE RULE OF DESTRUCTIBILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES
The decision in Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz is in accord with
modern property law in the United States. Only four states currently
15. Id.at ___

600P.2d at 279.

16. Id.
17. Id.at
600 P.2d at 280.
18. Id. at
, 600P.2dat 281.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. The court cited Cook v. Daniels, 306 S.W.2d 573 (Mo. 1957), which stands, in part,
for the proposition that one normally can convey only the interest he actually owns in property
and no more.
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preserve the rule that contingent remainders are destructible.2" Many
states have completely abolished the rule by statute.2 3 Five jurisdictions have abolished the rule only as applied to merger and
forfeiture." ' Four other states have abolished the rule by judicial
decision.25
22. The states perserving the rule are Florida, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee (all by
judicial decision). L. Simes & A. Smith, supra note 4, § 209.
In Lewis v. City of Orlando, 145 Fla. 285, 199 So. 49 (1940), the issue was whether a contingent remainder in an estate is destroyed upon the termination of the particular estate upon
which the contingent remainder is dependent. In the opinion, which did not mention the facts
of the case, the Supreme Court of Florida did not present any reasons for preserving the rule,
other than stare decisis.
The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the rule in Love v. Lindstedt, 76 Or. 66, 147 P. 935
(1915). This case involved people holding contingent remainders in property who conveyed
their interest to the life tenant. The court held that these potential contingent remaindermen's
interests were merged with the life estate. Thus, the life tenant held the property in fee simple
and the remaindermen's interests were destroyed. The court stated the following rule:
Contingent remainders may be defeated, by destroying or determining the particular estate upon which they depend, before the contingency happens whereby
they become vested. Therefore, when there is a tenant for life, . . . he may, not
only by his death, but by alienation, surrender, or other methods, destroy and
determine his own life estate before any of those remainders vest; the consequence of which is that he utterly defeats them all. Blackstone, vol. 2, p. 172.
Id. at __
, 147 P. at 937. Thus, the court relied on a mere restatement of the destructibility
rule. This reliance on ancient doctrine is typical of those few jurisdictions which still recognize
the rule of destructibility. The cases do not question the policies behind the rule.
23. The states which completely abolish the rule by statute are Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. L. Simes & A. Smith, supra note 4, § 207.
24. These jurisdictions are Maine, Mississippi, Rhode Island, Texas, and the District of
Columbia. Id. See L. Simes & A. Smith, supra note 4, § 197 for the definitions of merger and
forfeiture.
25. These states are: Indiana: Rouse v. Paidrick, 221 Ind. 517, 49 N.E.2d 528 (1943); Kansas: Miller v. Miller, 91 Kan. 1, 136 P. 953 (1913); New Hampshire:Hayward v. Spaulding, 75
N.H. 92, 71 A. 219 (1908); and Oklahoma: Whitten v. Whitten, 203 Okla. 196, 219 P.2d 228
(1950). The facts of Whitten are substantially similar to those in Abo Petroleum Corp. v.
Amstutz. The grantor conveyed a life estate with remainder over to the heirs of the life tenant.
This conveyance at common law would have resulted in the application of the Rule in Shelley's
Case. This rule held that the contingent remainder in the heirs of the life tenant became a
vested remainder in the life tenant in fee simple. The doctrine of merger then would have
caused the two estates to coalesce. Hence, the life tenant would then have a present estate in fee
tail. C. Moynihan, supra note 7, at 140-41. Oklahoma, however, had a statute which abolished
the Rule in Shelley's Case. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 41 (West 1971). Thus, the remainder over
was considered to be a contingent remainder. The grantor subsequently conveyed her reversion
to the life tenant. It was argued by the life tenants that the rule was applicable and, therefore,
the contingent remaindermen were precluded from asserting their interests because of the doctrine of merger. The court did not address the issue of destructibility on a policy level. Rather,
it held that the reversionary interest was subordinate to the contingent remainder. The court
stated:
Since the effect of the conveyance was to create a contingent remainder in the entire fee, the only alienable or assignable estate remaining in the grantor was that
of reversion which was subordinate to the contingent remainder because its en-
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The Restatement of Property has also abandoned the rule of destructibility.26 The rule was said to be an anachronism which caused
confusion in the law because courts and legislatures had developed
exceptions to its harsh application. "
THE EFFECT OF THE ABO DECISION
Several issues regarding the effect of the Abo holding remain to be
resolved. The first set of issues concerns the retroactive judicial
abolition of a common law rule. The second set of issues concerns
the impact of the decision on the rule of destructibility in New
Mexico.
Questions Concerning the RetroactiveJudicial
Abolition of a Common Law Rule
In Abo, the supreme court refused to apply an existing common
law rule to an ongoing dispute. The retroactive effect of the
holding2 8 may be an unconstitutional taking of property without due
process of law. 2" Courts in other jurisdictions have, however, upheld
abolishing statutes against constitutional challenges, despite the
statutes' retroactive effects. 3" In Jennings v. Capen, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the legislature had constitutional power to
abolish the rule of destructibility. 3 ' The court held that a legislature
can change, modify, or abolish such rules because future expectajoyment is dependent upon the failure of the event upon the occurrence of which
the remainder was to vest.
203 Okla. at ___, 219 P.2d at 232. But see Miller v. Miller, 92 Kan. 1, 136 P,953 (1913). The
court in Miller acknowledged the legislature's intent, as shown in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2205
(1976) (original version at Gen. Stat. 1868 c. 22, § 3), not to rely on the feudal reasons for the
rule of destructibility. See also Evans v. Bishop Trust Co., 21 Hawaii 74 (1912).
26. Restatement of Property § 240 (1936).
27. Id.For instance, one method of avoiding the application of the rule was to find another
interposed vested estate which suported the contingent remainder. Another method was to find
that trustees who were created for other purposes previously fulfilled continued to function as
"trustees to preserve." Id. at Comment b.
28. The holding is retroactive because the predecessors of the plaintiff purchased the land
many years before the decision in Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz. At the time of the purchase,the doctrine of merger and the rule of destructibility were part of English common law as
adopted in New Mexico. See note 2 supra. Thus, purchasers could have reasonably relied on
New Mexico's upholding the doctrine of merger and the rule of destructibility.
29. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2; N.M. Const. art. 2, § 18.
291, 151
30. Wood v. Chase, 327 111.91, 158 N.E. 470 (1927); Jennings v. Capen, 321 Ill.
N.E. 900 (1926); People's Loan & Exch. Bank v. Garlington, 54 S.C. 413, 32 S.E. 513 (1899).
at __
, 151 N.E. at 902. But see People's Loan & Exch. Bank v.
31. 321 Ill.
Garlington, note 30 supra, which held a similar statute constitutional because, inter alia, the
statute only barred application of the rule after the date of the statute. Hence, the effect of the
statute was to bar future action and therefore was clearly within the powers of the legislature.
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tions of property (such as a future right to destroy a contingent remainder) do not rise to the level of a vested right.I Because the New
Mexico Supreme Court did not address this issue in the Abo opinion,
the court obviously considered its decision to be constitutional.3 3
The Abo holding may have been based on reasoning similar to
that in Jennings.34 Alternatively, the court might have reasoned that
in light of its abolition in other jurisdictions, property holders were
not justified in relying on the rule of destructibility simply because
New Mexico courts had not yet addressed the rule's vitality.35 In

addition, the court may have realized that its decision would not
disturb the grantor's intended disposition of the property. The Abo
holding would guarantee that property will pass to the contingent
remaindermen, as the grantor, testator, or intestate intended, if the
remainder vests. This policy rationale, combined with other policy
rationales, may have outweighed a constitutional claim of doubtful

validity.
The New Mexico Supreme Court also decided in Abo that abolition of the common law rule was a proper subject for judicial decision. In Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Products Co.,37 the court
32. One of the parties in Jennings held a life tenancy and a reversion in the property in question. The court regarded his right to destroy a contingent remainder interest in the property to
be a mere inchoate right which the legislature had a right to deprive him of. 321 I11.at __,
151 N.E. at 902.
33. None of the parties argued this issue in their briefs. Defendant-Appellants' Brief-inChief, Plaintiff-Appellees' Answer Brief, Defendant-Appellants' Reply Brief, Abo Petroleum
Corp. v. Amstutz, 93 N.M. 332, 600 P.2d 278 (1979).
34. One distinction, however, between Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz and Jennings v.
Capen is that a vested rather than an inchoate right might have been established in Abo
because all the acts necessary to destroy the contingent remainder were performed prior to the
rendering of the decision in the case. In Jennings, however, the acts which formerly would have
destroyed the contingent remainder were not performed until after the effective date of the
statute.
35. See notes 22-25 supra.
36. The New Mexico Supreme Court could have used a different analysis in approaching the
problem in Abo. New Mexico currently has a statute which possibly can be construed as sufficient evidence of legislative intent to abolish the rule. The statute states:
When any possession has been or shall be conveyed limiting the remainder of the
possession to the son or daughter of any person, born after the death of its
parent, possession shall be taken the same as if he or she was born during the life
of the parent, although no possession should have been conveyed to sustain the
remainder of a contingent possession after his death, and after this an absolute
possession or bequest may be made, comencing in the future, in writing in the
same manner as by will.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-1-20 (1978) (emphasis added). The fact that the legislature added the
phrase "commencing in the future" seems to abrogate a premise which underlies the rule (the
rule forbidding estates to commence in the future).
A question arises as to the reason the court decided to abolish the rule by judicial reasoning
rather than by relying on the statute. One reason could be that the court was unaware of the
statute because the attorneys did not use this statute in their briefs. Defendant-Appellants'
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stated that rules of substantive law should be changed only infrequently by the courts.
[W]e are not inclined to change long established rules just for the
sake of change, and we are particularly reluctant to abandon or
change a long established rule with widespread ramifications in
an area of substantive law, unless we can be reasonably sure that
the change is very likely to improve the administration of justice.
Ours is a dual responsibility of fashioning rules of law responsive to the accomplishment of justice in a changing society, while
at the same time preserving established rules of law and the
stability essential to the accomplishment of justice under law."
Syroid dealt with a change from contributory negligence to comparative negligence, which had not received wide judicial and legislative approval at the time of the decision. Abo is not inconsistent with
the Syroid holding because of the changing state of the law regarding
the rule of destructibility. The court in Abo must have thought that
applying the rule of destructibility would not be responsive to the
modern needs of the people of New Mexico. Therefore, the court
held that the rule of destructibility should be abolished. 39
Brief-in-Chief, Plaintiff-Appellees' Answer Brief, Defendant-Appellants' Reply Brief.
Another reason could be that the statute does not indicate that livery of seisin or any other act
or ceremony is not necessary to convey real property.
Kansas has a statute similar to New Mexico's which served as the basis for judicial abolition
of the rule of destructibility. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2205 (1976). Miller v. Miller, 92 Kan. 1, 136
P. 593 (1913), construed the Kansas statute which states: "Conveyances of land, or of any
other estate or interest therein, may be made by deed, executed by any person having authority
to convey the same . . . without any other act or ceremony whatsoever." (Emphasis added).
A contingent remainder could not be created at common law without the concurrent creation
of a particular estate of freehold (such as a life estate) as support for the remainder; conveyances of estates to commence infuturo were not allowed. Thus, in order to create an estate
to commence infuturo, a precedent particular estate was required to support it. The livery of
seisin used to convey the particular estate inured to the contingent remainderman. Therefore, if
the particular estate ceased to exist, the contingent remainder was destroyed.
The precise issue, then, is whether "commencing in the future" in N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 47-1-20 (1978) means that a particular estate is not required as a foundation for contingent
remainder. The court in Miller felt that the language in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-2205 did not contain this requirement. Arguably, neither does the New Mexico statute. The Kansas statute
does, however, do away with the requirement of livery of seisin with very explicit language
while the New Mexico statute does not. Thus, an argument that the New Mexico statute does
away with the requirement that a contingent remainder must always be supported by a particular estate is less forceful. On balance, however, the court in Abo could have read the statute
as abolishing the rule of destructibility.
37. 86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974).
38. Id. at 237, 522 P.2d at 572.
39. The court recognized that it was diverging from the common law of England, as adopted
in New Mexico, by holding the rule of destructibility inapplicable in Abo. 93 N.M. at __
600 P.2d at 280. In so doing, the court relied on Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153
(1976). In Hicks, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity
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Another related issue is whether the court should have deferred to
the legislature in deciding whether to abolish the rule of destuctibility. In Hicks v. State,4 the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that
it was not necessary to defer to the legislature's decision as to
whether the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity should be
abolished."' The court reasoned that sovereign immunity could be
abolished by the courts because the doctrine had been judicially
created without statutory codification." The doctrine was codified
in the statutory law merely to give the judiciary some precedential
foundation on which to rely. 3 One can argue by analogy that the
rule of destructibility had been codified for the same reason, and
that the court, therefore, acted properly in abolishing the rule.
The PreciseImpact of the Abo Holding on New Mexico
PropertyLaw Is Not Readily Apparent
The holding in Abo may apply as a general rule of law to situations which are factually different from that in the Abo case. The
scope of the holding is quite broad. The supreme court stated:
"Because the doctrine of destructibility . . . is but a relic of the
feudal past, which has no justification in modern society, we decline
to apply it in New Mexico. '"4' Thus, the rule is probably abolished in
all respects, including destruction by merger, forfeiture, and expirawas no longer applicable to present day conditions and was therefore abolished. The immunity
was based on the feudal notion that the sovereign can do no wrong. The court found that,
because contemporary society bears little resemblance to feudal England, sovereign immunity
should be abolished. Id. at 588, 544 P.2d at 1155. Likewise, the court felt justified in
abolishing the common law rule of destructibility because, inter alia, it has marginal utility in
contemporary society and relied on Hicks as precedent for rejecting common law rules. Abo
, 600 P.2d at 280.
Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 93 N.M. at __
40. 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1976).
41. Id. at 590, 544P.2dat 1155.
42. Id.
43. The rule of destructibility and the doctrine of sovereign immunity were both derived
from the common law of England as it existed in 1789 and as adopted by statute in New Mexico. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-3 (1978). There may, however, be a statute in New Mexico which
directly or indirectly controls the rule of destructibility. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-1-20 (1978); see
note 36 supra.
44. This reasoning probably lessens the decision's retroactive impact. If destructibility is a
common law rule, then arguably when the reason behind the rule ends, the rule itself may be ignored. In Marchiando v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d 1160 (1977), the New Mexico Supreme
Court also considered the issue of deference to the legislature. The issue in Marchiandowas
whether tavern owners could be held liable for the negligent sale of intoxicating liquors to an
inebriated person who left the tavern in an automobile. The driver struck and killed the plaintiff's deceased. The court held that the issue was for the legislature to decide. The court also
held that if the legislature did not act in the future that it would not be improper for the court
to act. Id. at 369, 573 P.2d at 1161-62.
45. 93 N.M. at -, 600 P.2d at 281.
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tion of time."6 On the other hand, one can argue that this language is
mere dicta and that the holding should apply to the abolition of
destructibility by merger only. The latter argument would suggest
that the rule can still be applied to destroy a contingent remainder by
expiration of time or by forfeiture.
The holding may also affect the application of other property
rules in New Mexico. For instance, the Rule Against Perpetuities
may become a factor to consider more often with respect to contingent remainders because of the holding in Abo. If a contingent remainder will either vest or be destroyed within the perpetuity period,
it is valid." 7 Because contingent remainders cannot be destroyed in
New Mexico, the remainders must vest within the perpetuity period
in order to be valid."
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court's holding in Abo Petroleum
Corp. v. Amstutz abolishes the rule of destructibility in New Mexico. The supreme court has wisely followed the vast majority of
states by abolishing a rule which has its roots in feudal England and
bears little relevance to our modern society. Judicial abolition of the
common law rule is constitutionally defensible and serves reasonable
public policy. The future impact on property law in New Mexico,
however, remains to be settled.
MATTHEW E. COHEN

46. See noteg 6-8 supra for definitions of destructibility of contingent remainders by merger,
forfeiture, and expiration of time.
47. L. Simes & A. Smith, supra note 4, § 1230. Thus, A devises land to B for life, remainder
to B's grandchildren. B has no grandchildren alive at A's death. If a grandchild of B is born
during B's life, the remainder is valid because it vested within the perpetuity period. If a grandchild is not born during B's life, the contingent remainder will be destroyed, provided the rule
of destructibility is still in effect.
48. One argument in support of the rule of destructibility is that it promotes the alienability
of land. Land is not tied up because the contingent remainder can be destroyed. Thus, a
substantial period of time would possibly have to elapse until the contingent remainder vests
except for the fact that it must vest within the perpetuity period or not at all.

